minseok kim

Groundwork for a Return to Parsimonious First-order Metaphysics

A growing movement in contemporary metaphysics–higher-order metaphysics–holds that metaphysical theorizing must be conducted in a language that employs higher-order quantification alongside first-order quantification. Against this tide, my dissertation defends first-order metaphysics, the Quinean doctrine that metaphysical theorizing must be conducted in a language that employs only first-order quantification. I show that first-order metaphysics, when combined with the principle of ontological parsimony (also known as Occam’s razor), defuses the principal objections raised against it, each of which turns on a version of Russell’s Paradox. I then identify further theoretical benefits of parsimonious first-order metaphysics, showing that it resolves a paradox arising elsewhere in metaphysics. Finally, I develop arguments against higher-order metaphysics itself.